CIA and State’s new China centers risk bureaucratic boondoggle

What's next in U.S.-China relations.

Jun 02, 2022 View in browser   By Phelim Kine The State Department's China House and CIA's China Mission Center are designed to surge funding, resources and personnel into centralized hubs tasked solely to track China's growing global footprint. | Left: J. Scott Applewhite/AP Photo, Right: Mark Wilson/Getty Images Hi, China Watchers. This week we peek under the hood of the new China-focused entities at State and the CIA. We'll also examine China's Pacific island diplomatic stumble, explore the struggle between memory and erasure of Tiananmen, and profile a book that explains why bureaucratic mediocrity is essential for dictatorial rule. We also debut the China Watcher Quiz (which includes cool prizes). Details at the bottom of the newsletter. Let's get to it. – Phelim With help from Daniel Lippman In Washington, nothing quite says this is important quite like a new agency. The State Department and Central Intelligence Agency have created centers in recent months to counter what Secretary of State ANTONY BLINKEN on Wednesday called China's emergence as "the most serious long-term challenge to [the] rules-based order." But already, former State and CIA officials are warning that internal resistance to those initiatives may undermine their effectiveness in challenging China's growing economic, diplomatic and military heft. The State Department's China House and CIA's China Mission Center are designed to surge funding, resources and personnel into centralized hubs tasked solely to track China's growing global footprint. "The responsibility of the [CIA] director and the people around the director is to make damn sure that [China Mission Center] doesn't just become another bureaucratic hellhole in which people establish positions for the sake of establishing positions and don't develop the kind of sharpness that you need in order to get the job done," former CIA director LEON PANETTA told China Watcher. Old wine, new bottles. Former State Department officials have similar concerns. "It's not obvious to me as a former State Department official how China House is different from [the existing] China Desk. … It sounds more to me like this is a way of branding a surge capacity which has been long overdue," said DAN BAER , former U.S. ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. "When anything like this gets sold as a new way of coordinating to make sure that we have a whole of government approach to policy issue X, it can also include incredible bureaucratic grind … the State Department clearance process was already onerous and not only slows down but also waters down good thinking." The CIA announced the China Mission Center's creation in October and described the initiative as the agency's response to "the global challenge posed by the People's Republic of China that cuts across all of the Agency's mission areas," an agency press statement said. The State Department's creation of the China House was revealed by Foreign Policy in September in a story that described the new entity as a centralized hub dedicated to monitoring China's global activities that will roughly double the number of State Department officials currently tasked to tracking China. Secretary of State Blinken name-checked the initiative in his China strategy speech last week and described it as part of his "modernization agenda," noting that it would "coordinate and implement our [China] policy across issues and regions." Former State Department and CIA officials we spoke with all supported a greater focus on China but warned that the new bureaucracies could obstruct rather than optimize efforts to counter China's growing economic, diplomatic and military heft. The CIA declined to disclose details of the China Mission Center's management, budget or staffing. "I can assure you it is fully up and running," a person familiar with the center told China Watcher. Bureaucratic battlefield. But tensions within the agency may undermine its effectiveness. "[China Mission Center] is a signaling to the adversary and signaling throughout the U.S. government that [China] is being given a little more priority," said a former China-focused CIA officer, who requested anonymity due to agency confidentiality restrictions. "But whenever you create these new things, it usually doesn't go smoothly. Bureaucratically … knives come out [and] unique personalities come into play." The fate of the Iran and North Korea mission centers that CIA Director WILLIAM BURNS reintegrated into the agency's Middle East and East Asia focus centers last year offers a cautionary tale of the sustainability of country-specific CIA centers. "Nothing significantly changed for those [Iran and North Korea] missions — they didn't get massive budget increases, or massive amounts of new people or billets," the former CIA officer said. "And one of the reasons is because those things have to come at the expense of the other missions, and the agency is hyper-feudal." The CIA disputes that assessment. An agency official said "we believe that [intelligence efforts] could benefit better from having its own focal center at the CIA." The China Mission Center's first battles will likely be internal squabbles over resources. "The people who work on Russia and Iran and the Middle East and terrorism and WMD and everything else — they're going to be making their own cases for resource prioritization, intelligence priorities and policy priorities," said PAUL HEER, former national intelligence officer for East Asia. Hurry up and wait. The State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs declined to comment on the status and operations of China House. That might reflect State's chagrin that the initiative may not be fully operational until 2024 due to renovations at its dedicated office building. "It could be 1.5-2 years before officers actually move in there (talk about wanting to compete with China but can't even build a 60-person office in less than a year)," a State Department official not authorized to speak to the media told China Watcher in a text message. The official described the pending relocation as essential to ensure China House staffers — whose numbers will grow from the current 25 China Desk officers to around 60 — have access to secure phones and classified systems. Super-charging collaboration. Former State Department personnel praised the prospect of a surge in China-focused resources and personnel. "Ideally, China House will serve both as a resource to the entire department and as an early warning center that can connect dots between regions and make informed assessments about the PRC's global activities," said DANNY RUSSEL, former assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs. China House may also reduce internal turf battles over policy by including representatives from all State Department divisions relevant to China as well as the National Security Council. "You can diffuse a lot of the [internal] bureaucratic debates because you can get a sense from those representatives of what their institutions' point of view is from the very beginning of the policy process, as opposed to kind of germinating something within the State Department, bringing it to the interagency, then having all of the other agencies shoot it down," said PAUL HAENLE, a former National Security Council China director. But establishing that interdepartmental harmony will require clear messaging from Blinken. "There are lots of overlapping interests that touch multiple bureaus already in the building — from economic to human rights issues," the State Department official said. "If the Secretary doesn't make clear the China House has the authority to guide all policy related to China, it will just turn into another large fish in an already crowded pond."' TRANSLATING WASHINGTON — BIDEN, ARDERN FRET PACIFIC 'STRATEGIC BALANCE': President JOE BIDEN and New Zealand Prime Minister JACINDA ARDERN warned Wednesday of the regional security implications of China's security pact with Solomon Islands . "The establishment of a persistent military presence in the Pacific by a state that does not share our values or security interests would fundamentally alter the strategic balance of the region and pose national-security concerns to both our countries," a joint U.S.-New Zealand statement said. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson ZHAO LIJIAN said Wednesday the statement "distorts and smears China's normal cooperation with Pacific Island countries."  — BLINKEN BLASTS BACHELET'S CHINA TRIP: Blinken on Saturday criticized conditions Chinese authorities imposed on last week's China visit by U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights MICHELLE BACHELET. "[They] did not enable a complete and independent assessment of the human rights environment in the PRC, including in Xinjiang, where genocide and crimes against humanity are ongoing," Blinken said in a statement. That angered Beijing. "The U.S. … made up new lies that China has restricted and manipulated the visit," the Foreign Ministry's Zhao said Monday. The five-day trip, which ended Saturday, landed the U.N. "an annual senior strategic meeting" with Beijing authorities and a new "working group to facilitate substantive exchanges, " Bachelet said in a Saturday media briefing. "The two concrete visit outcomes … are simply yet more high-level talk shops which are inadequate to address the crisis-level of the human rights situation," SHARON HOM, executive director of the nonprofit Human Rights in China said in a statement. Hot from the China Watchersphere China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi speaks at a press conference at the Pacific Islands Foreign Ministers' meeting in Suva, Fiji, Monday, May 30, 2022. | Fiji Government via AP Photo  — BEIJING'S PACIFIC ISLAND DIPLOMATIC STUMBLE: Chinese Foreign Minister WANG YI struck out last week in trying to build upon China's controversial Solomon Islands security pact with new joint agreements on "traditional and non-traditional security" cooperation with 10 Pacific island countries. U.S. and Australian messaging on the potential dangers of closer ties with Beijing played a role in that decision. "We want to live in a free and open Indo-Pacific where there is a respect for rule of law," Palau's President SURANGEL WHIPPS, JR. told ABC Radio on Saturday. Wang is down but not out, responding to the setback on Monday by issuing a 24-point "Position Paper" packed with development and economic aid pledges for Pacific island nations. Translating China The Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong projected images onto Tower Bridge in central London on Tuesday commemorating the anniversary of the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen massacre. | POW — TIANANMEN, POWER AND MEMORY: Saturday marks the 33rd anniversary of the June 1989 Tiananmen massacre, when People's Liberation Army troops called in to end peaceful pro-democracy protests killed thousands of unarmed students and Beijing residents. The ruling Chinese Communist Party has airbrushed that bloodshed from the historical record and suppresses any attempts inside China to commemorate the victims. Chinese Defense Minister WEI FENGHE in 2019 defended the government's response to the June 1989 protests as "political turmoil that the central government needed to quell, which was the correct policy." The Chinese government has eradicated physical memorials to the massacre in Hong Kong since 2021. Hong Kong authorities have forced the closure of a museum dedicated to the incident, dismantled the Tiananmen-dedicated "Pillar of Shame" sculpture at the University of Hong Kong and compelled organizers of the annual June 4 vigils that attracted hundreds of thousands of Hong Kongers each year to end those commemorations. "The Chinese government has effectively consigned June 4 to the memory hole. All mention of it is banned on social media, the Internet, and of course in print media. I've met many younger Chinese who have no idea that this event took place," said ANDREW J. NATHAN, Class of 1919 professor of political science at Columbia University. Outside of China, memories and memorials persist. The new Victims of Communism Museum in Washington D.C. will open its doors June 13 with a Tiananmen massacre exhibit that includes "numerous physical items from 1989, including flags, pamphlets, artwork, a tent, and a shirt that became blood soaked when the wearer was severely beaten during the Chinese military crackdown" a museum flier said. Amnesty International will convene international vigil events. "Many thousands of Chinese study and live abroad, and they of course are exposed to the full range of information about Chinese history, including Tiananmen, that is not visible at home," said RANA MITTER, director of the University China Centre at Oxford. "The events of 1989 are now contemporary history rather than politics, but they are found in all standard Western textbooks on China, so are by no means forgotten." HEADLINES The Guardian: "The rise of 'bai lan': why China's frustrated youth are ready to 'let it rot'" New York Times: "Why China Is Miles Ahead in a Pacific Race for Influence" Lao Ren Cha: "No, America isn't 'provoking China' or 'threatening war', so please cut the horseshit" HEADS UP — CHINESE DEFENSE MINISTER SHANGRI-LA BOUND: China's Minister of Defense Wei has confirmed his attendance at the June 10-12 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, an annual international meeting of defense ministers. That raises the possibility of a face-to-face sideline meeting between Wei and his U.S. counterpart, LLOYD AUSTIN. One Book, Three Questions The cover of the book, "Coalitions of the Weak," is pictured. | Cambridge University Press The Book: Coalitions of the Weak: Elite Politics in China from Mao's Stratagem to the Rise of Xi The Author: VICTOR C. SHIH is the Ho Miu Lam Chair in China and Pacific Relations at UC San Diego's School of Global Policy and Strategy and an expert on the elite politics of China. What is the most important takeaway from your book? A basic problem in authoritarian politics is that top-level officials do not know fully who is on whose side and who is more powerful. MAO ZEDONG addressed this with his "mixing in sand" strategy of installing either very inexperienced or legally or ethically tainted officials in key positions. These officials either had no network or dared not to mobilize their networks for fear of a backlash. This created a weak and compromised elite less likely to work together to unseat the dictator. This dynamic allowed Mao and [Soviet leader JOSEPH] STALIN to maintain their positions for life.  What was the most surprising thing you learned while researching and writing this book? I learned that a group of senior People's Liberation Army generals during the Cultural Revolution survived the purges even though most of them were labeled "counter-revolutionary splittists." An official objective of the Cultural Revolution was the eradication of such elements. Yet here were bona fide counterrevolutionaries getting promoted to key military positions while hundreds without such labels were purged. This suggested a strategy by Mao of seeing value and power in weak or compromised senior officials.  What does your book tell us about the trajectory and future of U.S.-China relations? The Sino-U.S. rapprochement starting in 1970 provided an important backdrop for the installation of a "coalition of the weak." Once it took place and the threat of war receded, Mao could install mostly weak figures in the military and in the government. This suggests that there might be a tradeoff between effective state functions, including military effectiveness, and a ruler's desire to rule for life. Chinese President XI JINPING has clearly indicated his desire to rule for life, and less confrontation with China's neighbors and with the U.S. would provide him with greater domestic flexibility to achieve that goal. Got a book to recommend? Tell me about it at pkine@politico.com. The China Watcher Quiz Question: How many times did Secretary of State Antony Blinken say the phrase "China strategy" in his China strategy speech last week? Please tell me a) the correct number and b) identify in which paragraph(s) of the speech it appeared. The first five correct responses to pkine@politico.com get a personalized must-read new book about China! Thanks to: Ben Pauker, Matt Kaminski, digital producer Raymond Rapada, Daniel Lippman and editor John Yearwood. Do you have tips? Chinese-language stories we might have missed? Would you like to contribute to China Watcher or comment on this week's items? Email us at chinawatcher@politico.com.   Follow us

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