Thursday, July 28, 2022

Taiwan’s accelerating slide toward U.S.-China military flashpoint

What's next in U.S.-China relations.
Jul 28, 2022 View in browser
 
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By Phelim Kine

Taiwan Air Force IDF Fighter Jets fly over the drill area.

U.S. officials are pushing their Taiwanese counterparts to view Ukraine's success in fending off Russian forces as a blueprint for countering a Chinese attack by proposing arms sales geared to so-called asymmetric warfare. | Ashley Pon/Getty Images

Hi, China Watchers. This week we explore what — if anything — might stall Taiwan's slide toward casus belli for a future U.S.-China military conflict, preview the CCP leadership's Beidaihe beachside retreat and share some of the Chinese internet's cheekiest nicknames for President Xi Jinping. And we'll profile a book that unpacks the perceived follies of U.S. "engagement" with China.

Let's get to it — Phelim

Deepening U.S.-China rancor over Taiwan has transformed the self-governing island's role in the bilateral superpower relationship from long-term manageable irritant to risky running sore.

The stand-off between Washington and Beijing over a planned trip by House Speaker NANCY PELOSI to Taiwan next month — Pelosi has said that the Pentagon has warned her plane " would get shot down " if she proceeds with the visit — underscores its potential as a flashpoint for military conflict.

Reversing Taiwan's slide toward conflict risk status will require President JOE BIDEN and Chinese leader XI JINPING to reinforce their commitment to existing agreements governing the U.S.-China relationship at the price of potentially fraught domestic political consequences.

"We're smack in the middle of a security dilemma where both sides are convinced that they're the victim, and unless we can begin to dilute the security dilemma where neither side can resist a tit-for-tat retaliation and one-upmanship, then we remain in an extremely high-risk status," said DANNY RUSSEL , former assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs and vice president for international security and diplomacy at the Asia Society Policy Institute.

"Our starting point is ... that Beijing essentially promised that it would seek to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully, that Taipei basically promised that it would not close the door on the possibility of unification or declare independence, and the U.S. promised that it would not support Taiwan independence."

Beijing has sabotaged that status quo with a relentless campaign of hostility targeting Taiwan since the 2016 election of Taiwanese President TSAI ING-WEN of the pro-independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party. The Chinese government has rebuffed Tsai's efforts to reduce tensions and on Tuesday WANG YANG, chair of the influential CCP advisory body the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, warned Tsai's administration that it was pushing the island to the "abyss of disaster." That antagonism has prompted both the European Union and Japan to disavow such intimidation and seek closer ties with Taipei.

Hands off, it's ours. The Chinese Communist Party considers " reunification with Taiwan ," a territory that the CCP has never ruled, a "historical task." It's also key to Xi's credibility as he seeks an unprecedented third term as China's leader later this year. Earlier this month LIU JIEYI, director of the Chinese government's Taiwan Affairs Office, described "national reunification" — Beijing's shorthand for a Taiwan takeover — as an "inevitable requirement" of Xi's hawkish " national rejuvenation " policy.

The U.S. relationship with Taiwan is spelled out in the U.S.-China Three Communiqués , the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and the 1982 Six Assurances . The TRA commits the U.S. "to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan." None of those documents specifically obligate the U.S. to military intervention to protect Taiwan in the face of a PRC invasion. But the TRA suggests an active U.S. role in maintaining the island's status quo.

PLA power play. An intensifying Chinese campaign of military intimidation toward Taiwan is testing those commitments. " Routine transit " of U.S. naval forces through the Taiwan Strait has sparked Chinese accusations that the U.S. is " deliberately intensifying tensions ." Beijing backed that rhetoric last month by claiming the entirety of the Taiwan Strait as Chinese waters. Taiwan's Foreign Ministry dismissed that claim as a "distortion of international law," a position echoed by State Department spokesperson NED PRICE.

"Our [Taiwan] policy has not changed, but unfortunately that does not seem to be true for the PRC," Defense Secretary LLOYD AUSTIN said last month . The Pentagon views Chinese saber-rattling with alarm. "The PRC is altering the status quo that has long served the region and in ways that have profound implications for our collective security," ELY RATNER, assistant secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, said Tuesday .

Russia's Ukraine invasion has sharpened administration sensitivities toward China's Taiwan intentions. U.S. officials are pushing their Taiwanese counterparts to view Ukraine's success in fending off Russian forces as a blueprint for countering a Chinese attack by proposing arms sales geared to so-called asymmetric warfare.

"It is unlikely that we will go back to any [earlier] status quo [because] the United States is quite alarmed about the growing threats to Taiwan," said BONNIE GLASER, Asia program director at the German Marshall Fund of the U.S. "There is some validity to China's concern when they say that there is a gap between the actions of the United States and the language that we do not support Taiwan independence."

Watch your language. Biden has asserted three times since August that the U.S. will militarily defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion attempt. Each time, aides have walked back comments that appear to reverse the longtime policy of " strategic ambiguity " regarding U.S. willingness to defend Taiwan. The State Department's removal of a U.S. disavowal of Taiwan independence from its Taiwan page in May reaped furious pushback from Beijing . State quietly re-inserted the statement — "we do not support Taiwan independence" — a month later.

Such backpedals likely won't ease bilateral frictions. "It's blisteringly obvious that the U.S. and China are in an insecurity spiral over Taiwan. … The good old days when we didn't have to worry too much about Taiwan are behind us for good," said KHARIS TEMPLETON, research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

The Trump formers factor. Former Trump-era senior government officials have complicated Biden's ability to reassure China about U.S. intentions. Former Secretary of State — and potential GOP presidential candidate in 2024 — MIKE POMPEO called in March for the U.S. to recognize the island "as a free and sovereign country," a position he repeated last month .

"There were a lot of people, including within the Democratic Progressive Party, that didn't think that was such a great idea because one of [Beijing's] 'red lines' is [Taiwan] saying that 'Yes, we're an independent nation,'" said WILLIAM A. STANTON, former director of the American Institute in Taiwan and chair professor at National Chengchi University in Taipei.

Former Secretary of Defense MARK ESPER wants a total overhaul of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. "I believe strategic ambiguity and the One-China Policy have run its course," Esper said Tuesday in an Atlantic Council briefing .

Those sentiments resonate in Taiwan where a majority opposes unification with China and upwards of 72.5 percent of Taiwanese say they're willing to fight if China invades.

"Chinese policy towards Taiwan is the primary cause of our current and long-standing crisis," said KUAN-TING CHEN , chief executive officer of the Taiwan NextGen Foundation, a Taipei-based think tank. "What can resolve this conflict quickly, directly, and peacefully, is a shift away from the aggressive and colonial intentions of Beijing towards a legitimate willingness to cooperate on issues of global concern."

Congressional pile-on. Congress is narrowing Biden's ability to return to a status quo that may soothe Beijing's Taiwan hypersensitivities. Sen. BOB MENENDEZ ( D-N.J.), chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, will take up his Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 at the committee's next meeting on Wednesday, said JUAN PACHON, the committee's communications director.

The bill will designate Taiwan a "Major Non-NATO Ally" and funnel almost $4.5 billion in security assistance to the island over the next four years. "The president needs to make clear his administration will defend Taiwan's sovereignty," Sen. MARCO RUBIO (R-Fla.), senior SFRC member, said in a statement.

On the House side, the Taiwan Peace and Stability Act , sponsored by Rep. AMI BERA (R-Calif.), chair of the subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and Nonproliferation, has amendment status in the fiscal 2023 National Defense Authorization Act. The TPSA requires the president to "report a whole-of-government strategy to enhance deterrence over a military conflict between China and Taiwan.'

Those initiatives appeal to China observers frustrated by Beijing's Taiwan provocations.

"The Chinese side always presents itself as blaming [the U.S.], saying, 'You're the ones who are rocking the boat' ignoring the fact that they are the ones who've been ratcheting up this pressure for the last six years," said AARON L. FRIEDBERG, former deputy assistant for National Security Affairs in the Office of the Vice President and professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University. "I think we've been talking too much and not doing as much as we should be doing to strengthen Taiwan's defenses and our own defenses – those are the most important signals that we can send rather than verbal formulations or reassuring phone calls."

TRANSLATING WASHINGTON

— BIDEN EYES IN-PERSON XI MEETING: Biden aims to manage rising tensions over Taiwan, trade and a deadlocked bilateral diplomatic agenda in his call today with Xi, your host reported Tuesday . Administration officials will pitch the call as a deliverable-free follow-up to a series of communications between Biden and Xi that senior administration officials say are aimed to ensure competition "doesn't lead to conflict." Biden's main objective: insulate the latest eruption of Chinese rage over House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's planned trip to Taiwan from plans for a long-awaited in-person meeting between the two leaders in November.

— SENATE PASSES CHINA-FOCUSED CHIPS BILL: The Senate on Wednesday voted 64-33 to approve a massive package of semiconductor manufacturing subsidies and scientific research funding known as the "chip plus science" bill, sending the legislation to the House for what Democratic leaders hope will be speedy passage, POLITICO's GAVIN BADE reported . The bill, in the works for almost two years, is intended to decrease U.S. reliance on computer chips manufactured in foreign countries, particularly China, and fund research into future scientific and technological advances to keep American industries competitive with Beijing and other foreign adversaries.

— WHITE HOUSE DISSES TRUMP CHINA TARIFFS:  The Biden administration has dismissed Trump-era China tariffs as a "shoddy deal" that has harmed U.S. interests, POLITICO's DOUG PALMER reported Tuesday . "We believe that they've increased costs of American families and small businesses … without actually addressing some of China's harmful trade practices," said JOHN KIRBY, a spokesperson for the White House National Security Council.

 — PORTMAN: CHINA SEEKING FED INFLUENCE: Sen. ROB. PORTMAN (R-Ohio) released a report on Tuesday alleging long-term Chinese government efforts to recruit Federal Reserve economists in a bid to gain influence over the central bank, POLITICO'S KATE DAVIDSON reported. Fed Chair JEROME POWELL expressed "strong concerns about assertions and implications'' about the report's findings. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson ZHAO LIJIAN on Wednesday dismissed Portman's allegations as "political disinformation."


Hot from the China Watchersphere

A screenshot taken from Rishi Sunak's Twitter account.

Rishi Sunak on Sunday accused his opponent, Liz Truss, of ignoring "China's nefarious activity and ambitions." | A screenshot taken from Rishi Sunak's Twitter account.

— U.K. LEADERSHIP RIVALS TAP CHINA FEARS: Tough-on-China rhetoric is part of the platforms of leading Conservative Party candidates seeking to succeed outgoing British Prime Minister BORIS JOHNSON. Former Chancellor RISHI SUNAK on Sunday accused his opponent , Defense Minister LIZ TRUSS, of ignoring "China's nefarious activity and ambitions." Truss shot back on Monday by alleging that while chancellor, Sunak had pursued "closer economic relations with China." The Foreign Ministry's Zhao chided both candidates on Monday for "irresponsible remarks."

 — JAPAN FLAGS RISING CHINESE MILITARY THREAT: China poses a growing military threat to Japan, the country's Defense Minister, KISHI NOBUO, warned Friday in the Defense of Japan 2022 white paper . "China continues to unilaterally change or attempt to change the status quo by coercion in the East China Sea and South China Sea … [and] has made clear that it would not hesitate to unify Taiwan by force," Nobuo said in the document's preface. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson WANG WENBIN dismissed those concerns on Friday as "groundless accusations"

Translating China

Fishermen row a boat to launch out before sunrise near a beach in Qinhuangdao of Hebei Province, north China.

Xi Jinping will convene the secretive annual meeting of senior Chinese Communist Party officials next week at Hebei province's Beidaihe beach resort. | China Photos/Getty Images

— CCP BEIDAIHE BEACH BASH: Xi will convene the secretive annual meeting of senior Chinese Communist Party officials next week at Hebei province's Beidaihe beach resort. Top of the agenda: Prep for the autumn's 20th Party Congress at which Xi is widely expected to emerge with an unprecedented third term as China's paramount leader. That includes finalizing Xi's political report which will set the policy agenda for his third term.

"[Report] drafts may be circulated to the elite for additional commentaries and suggestions, but given how powerful Xi is, I don't expect major revisions or debates," VICTOR SHIH , the Ho Miu Lam chair in China and Pacific Relations at UC San Diego's School of Global Policy and Strategy, told China Watcher. "The other issue is who is going to stay and who's going to go from the Politburo Standing Committee - outside observers are still uncertain about whether people like [Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Chair] WANG YANG and [Premier] LI KEQIANG will stay in the Politburo Standing Committee."

—XI'S ONLINE NICKNAMES SPARK CENSORSHIP SPREE: The non-profit China Digital Times' editor JOSEPH BROUWER has compiled a handy list of snarky nicknames for Xi that CCP censors are purging from China's internet. We've compiled our favorites below with a hat tip to Brouwer and CDT.

"The Driving-in-Reverse Emperor": Xi's critics have tagged him the accelerator-in-chief, an accusation that his attempt to drag China back into its totalitarian past is hastening the Communist Party's demise.

"Xissolini": Comparison to the Italian fascist dictator BENITO MUSSOLINI.

"Foreskin Xi": Likely a play on Steamed Bun Xi, a nickname bestowed after he made a trip to a humble Beijing restaurant in 2013. "Baopi" has a variety of meanings, including "foreskin."

HEADLINES

Bloomberg: World War I History Is Wrong, and Skewing Our View of China

KVUE: As US works to bring Brittney Griner home, a Luling mother has been missing her son for 10 years

Foreign Policy: What Does Nancy Pelosi Think She's Doing in Taiwan ?

HEADS UP

— HEY, HEY IT'S ARMY DAY: Aug. 1 is Army Day in China and this year it marks the 95th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army. If the PLA celebrates with a 95 aircraft incursion into Taiwan's airspace on Monday, remember that you heard it here first.

One Book, Three Questions

A cover of the book

A cover of the book "Getting China Wrong" is pictured. | Polity Press

The Book: Getting China Wrong

The Author: Aaron L. Friedberg is a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University and former deputy assistant for national security affairs in the Office of the Vice President.

What is the most important takeaway from your book?

The West's strategy of engagement with China has failed. Instead of being transformed into an open, market-oriented, status quo power, China has become more repressive at home, more firmly wedded to mercantilist economic policies, and more openly revisionist in its external behavior. The simplest explanation for this failure is that, over the past 30 years, China's rulers have devised and implemented a more effective counter-strategy of their own, one that has enabled them to extract the considerable benefits of engagement, building up the nation's wealth and strength, while retaining their own exclusive grip on domestic political power.

What was the most surprising thing you learned while researching and writing this book?

All the developments in China that have aroused such concern – the harsh crackdowns on any hint of dissent, the doubling down on state-directed technology promotion and industrial programs, and the increasingly aggressive foreign policy – first became evident in the [former President] HU JINTAO era. So Xi's don't represent a radical break with the past; rather they appear to reflect the collective judgment of the CCP elite about the challenges confronting the Party and the range of acceptable options for dealing with them.

What does your book tell us about the trajectory and future of U.S.-China relations?

Over the course of the past 15 years, the ongoing deterioration in U.S.-China relations has been driven in large part by shifts in Beijing's behavior and these, in turn, are a product of the perceptions and preferences of those in the top ranks of the CCP regime. Growing confidence about China's rising power has fueled an increasingly ambitious and aggressive foreign policy. Barring some dramatic change in the composition and outlook of the Party's leadership, the downward trend of the past decade seems destined to continue and will probably accelerate.

Got a book to recommend? Tell me about it at pkine@politico.com .

Thanks to: Ben Pauker, Matt Kaminski, Nicolle Liu, Doug Palmer, Kate Davidson, Gavin Bade, digital producer Sinobia Aiden and editor John Yearwood.

Do you have tips? Chinese-language stories we might have missed? Would you like to contribute to China Watcher or comment on this week's items? Email us at chinawatcher@politico.com .

 

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